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NATO decisions are the expression of the collective will of its member goverments.
Under the rule, no Ally can be forced to approve an action against its will.
Consensus rule allows NATO to respect distinctive national/egis/ation.
Through the rule, NATO cab build political and military solidarity.
The consensus rule forces Allieas to undertake the widest possibler
consultations to build support for their ideas.
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1. Introduction
In their November 2006 Riga Summit Decla-
ration, the 26 Alliance heads of state and govern-
ment reaffirmed that "NATO remains open to new
European members under Article 10 of the North
Atlantic Treaty.": As expected, they stopped short
of issuing an invitation to any of the three formally
recognized aspirants-Croatia, Macedonia, and Al-
bania. They specified, however, that at their next
summit in 2008, "the Alliance intends to extend fur-
ther invitations to those countries who meet NATO's
performance based standards and are able to con-
tribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability." This
gives Croatia additional incentives and time to im-
plement the reforms and restructuring needed to en-
sure it will be invited to join. It also gives the
Croatian public more time to understand, debate and,
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hopefully, actively support the responsibilities inher-
ent in NATO membership. (It certainly is no acci-
dent that Croatia is the only aspirant to whom the
Summit Declaration signals a need "to ensure that
its membership aspirations are backed by stronger
popular support.")
To advance the goal of developing such pub-
lic support, it is important to understand the funda-
mentals of NATO decisionmaking.
2. Consensus: A Primer
Although international security affairs
cognoscenti often refer to the NATO consensus rule,
the North Atlantic Treaty does not specify how col-
lective decisions are to be made, with one excep-
tion: the Article 10 provision that "unanimous agree-
ment" is necessary to invite a state to join the Alli-
ance. Absent any explicit voting procedure, NATO
has developed a set of customary practices.
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3. The Power of the RuleMost decisions are based on draft proposals
circulated to all Allies by the Secretary General, who
chairs the North Atlantic Council (NAC), or by the
chairperson of one of the hundreds of NATO com-
mittees and working groups.' These draft proposals
may be initiated by the Secretary General, the IS, or
individual Allies. Written proposals generally are
preceded by consultations in a variety of forums, in-
cluding bilateral or multilateral discussions in allied
capitals, Allied missions at NATO Headquarters, the
NAC, and committees and working groups estab-
lished by the NAC. Such consultations are useful-
indeed, in some cases they are critical-to identify
possible concerns or objections among Allies and to
craft mutually acceptable solutions.
When a written decision or statement of posi-
tion is deemed necessary, it frequently occurs that
some or all of the Permanent Representatives (Perm
Reps) cannot provide their respective national posi-
tions at the conclusion of a specific AC or com-
mittee meeting. In such cases, the Secretary Gen-
eral or relevant committee chairperson may opt to
circulate the draft proposal under a silence proce-
dure.' If no Ally "breaks silence"-that is, notifies
the IS in writing of its objection before the deadline
set by the Secretary General or committee chairper-
son-the proposal is considered approved. How-
ever, if one or more Ally breaks silence, the pro-
posal is normally referred back to the relevant body
for further work to reach consensus. As a rule, NATO
does not publicly identify which countries break si-
lence, although national positions may be leaked to
the press (sometimes by the country breaking silence)
if the issue is contentious. Moreover, as there is no
formal voting procedure, there is no formal absten-
tion procedure, either.
The Secretary General routinely aids consen-
sus building through informal discussions with indi-
vidual Allied Perm Reps or groups of Perm Reps.
He also seeks to int1uence Alliance deliberations
through his public statements and private meetings
and correspondence with senior officials, legislators,
or opinion leaders of Allied governments. However,
the Secretary General or other senior IS officials can-
not overrule an Ally's position. Indeed, any per-
ceived effort by a NATO official to run roughshod
over an Ally's objections is apt to provoke sympa-
thetic objections from other Allies who are wary of
any precedent that could diminish their future pre-
rogatives.'
The consensus rule represents more than a
mechanistic decisionmaking procedure. It ret1ects
NATO's structure as an alliance of independent and
sovereign countries rather than a supranational body.
The rule also exemplifies for many the "one for all,
all for one" ethos of the organization's collective
defense commitment.' NATO decisions are the ex-
pression of the collective will of its member govern-
ments, arrived at by common consent. Under the
rule, no Ally can be forced to approve a position or
take an action against its will. This is especially
important for decisions on the potential use of mili-
tary force, which are among the most politically sen-
sitive for any Ally.
Even Article 5, the Treaty's key collective
defense provision, stops short of mandating the na-
ture of the assistance to be provided by eaeh Ally in
the event of an attack against the territory of another."
It is important to recall that the U.S. Executive
Branch, which was responsible for negotiating the
Treaty, insisted on qualified language in Article 5
largely to assuage concerns in Congress. Congress,
which has authority under the Constitution to de-
clare war, did not want to cede that power to any
multilateral organization. At the same time. the con-
sensus rule allows NATO to respect distinctive na-
tional legislation that may bear upon the ability of
Allies to contribute to certain NATO operations. For
example, Norway and Denmark do not allow peace-
time stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons
on their territory. Similarly, German law requires a
simple parliamentary majority to approve military
deployments outside Germany, whereas Hungarian
law requires a two thirds majority.' Iceland, for its
part, does not have a national military force. Through
the rule, NATO can build political and military soli-
darity through the Alliance as a whole without im-
posing one-size-fits-all standards on its diverse mem-
bership.
The consensus rule forces Allies to undertake
the widest possible consultations to build support for
their ideas. No Ally, large or small, can be taken for
granted. Despite its prominent role in the Alliance,
the United States also relies on the consensus rule to
protect its interests, to shape the views of others, and
to integrate ideas offered by others to improve its
proposals. Moreover, the impact of the consensus
rule is underscored by the fact that NATO makes
literally thousands of decisions annually, each of
which is tied, directly or indirectly, to a consensus
procedure. With few exceptions, these decisions fall
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into five broad categories: ?broad political and mili-
tary strategies, which are reflected in documents such
as the Alliance Strategic Concept and in decisions
regarding enlargement; ?military structure and plan-
ning functions, covering areas such as the NATO
command and force structure, capabilities develop-
ment, and contingency operational planning related
to potential military missions; ?authorizing, moni-
toring, and adjusting collective defense and crisis
management operations; ?organizational and man-
agement concerns, to include defining the responsi-
bilities and overseeing the operations of the IS, In-
tcrnational Military Staff, and various NATO agen-
cies; and resource and budgeting issues involving
NATO collective assets, personnel, infrastructure,
and operational funding.
Whilc sacrosanct in principle, the rule has
proved flexible in practice, as demonstrated by three
specific cases.
3.1. The French Connection
Following France's decision to withdraw from
the NATO Integrated Military Structure in 1966, the
other Allies turned increasingly to the Defense Plan-
ning Committee (DPC) to consider and decide upon
most defense matters and issues related to collective
defense planning. Created in 1963, the DPC was sel-
dom used before the French withdrawal. Similarly,
a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), with the same
membership as the DPC, was established soon after
the French withdrawal to discuss specific policy is-
sues associated with nuclear forces. Although re-
maining active in the NAC, France was neither bound
by, nor did it seek to impede, decisions made by con-
sensus in the DPC or NPG.
In 1992, NATO considered whether to launch
its first out-of-area crisis response Operation; these
were maritime and air surveillance operations in the
Adriatic in support ofa United Nations Security Coun-
cil (UNSC) Resolution, which imposed an embargo
on arms deliveries to Yugoslavia. The Allies in the
DPC agreed by consensus to discuss the issue in the
NAC. This move eased the way for French participa-
tion in the operation, which was favored by Paris and
broadly welcomed by other Allies. This also set the
precedent for the de facto leading role of the NAC
(versus the DPC) in subsequent crisis response op-
erations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia.
Thus, while remaining formally outside the In-
tegrated Military Structure, France has been a major
player in decisionmaking and planning-as well as
a leading force contributor-for all three of those
non-Article-S NATO operations. It also took part in
the April 2003 NAC decision to bring the UNSC-
mandated International Security Assistance Force
(TSAF) in Afghanistan under NATO command and
control in August 2003. France, which joined ISAF
when it was formed in January 2002, has continued
to participate in NATO-ISAF in various command
positions as well as a major troop contributor.
3.2. Kosovo
The 1999 NATO air campaign, Operation Al-
lied Force, against the Federal Republic ofYugosla-
via has been widely described -and decried by
some-as a "war by committee." Accounts differ
somewhat regarding the NATO decisionmaking proc-
ess during the campaign, but few challenge the ex-
istence of severe intra-Alliance strains; these ranged
from issues regarding the legitimacy of NATO mili-
tary action without an explicit UNSC Resolution to
the military strategy and tactics pursued during the
conflict. 8 On balance, however, the consensus rule
probably did more to help than hinder an ultimately
successful NATO effort.
The rule allowed Allies with differing views-
some emphasizing the humanitarian crisis and hu-
man rights abuses. others worried by the precedent
of NATO "offensive" action against a sovereign
state-to find enough common ground to endorse,
or at least not to block, Allied Force. The rule was
particularly important for the Greek government,
which ultimately decided not to break silence on key
NAC decisions authorizing the use of force despite
polls showing that some 95 percent of its public op-
posed NATO intervention. At the same time, Greece
opted out of direct involvement in the combat op-
erations.
The nuance between a decisionmaking proce-
dure that allows an Ally to acquiesce in a collective
decision (despite its public or private reservations)
and a procedure that would oblige that state to cast a
"yes" or "no" vote in the NAC may appear, at first
glance, insignificant. In practice, the nuance mat-
ters enormously. If Perm Reps had been required to
"raise hands" to approve Allied Force, the Greek gov-
ernment likely would not have been able to resist
the domestic political pressure to vote against it.
Such a move by Greece might have made it easier
for one or two other reluctant Allies to follow suit.
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The inherent flexibility of the consensus rule
also was demonstrated in decisionmaking on the tim-
ing, strategy, and tactics of Allied Force. For exam-
ple. during the crisis, the NAC frequently decided
not to engage subordinate committees. This kept sen-
sitive NAC discussions as private as possible and
facilitated rapid decisions, normally with a 48-hour
(or less) turnaround. Then Secretary General Javier
Solana played a key role in reconciling divergent
views within the NAC using a "summary of discus-
sions," one of several techniques devised to avoid
putting an unwelcome spotlight on any single Ally.
Furthermore, the NAC delegated to Secretary Gen-
eral Solana the authority to implement, suspend, or
terminate the Limited Air Response-the first phase
of the air campaign. In this way, the NAC ceded (by
consensus) the decision to the Secretary General to
initiate a pre-approved spectrum of air strikes. There
were differences later among Allies over target se-
lection and mission assignments, but these gener-
ally were solved through bilateral channels outside
NATO and involved only the parties directly con-
cerned.
In sum, while extraordinary efforts were re-
quired to maintain consensus throughout Allied
Force, these arguably were vital to preserving NATO
solidarity and ultimately achieving its stated objec-
tives in Kosovo.
3.3. September 11, 2001 attacks
The consensus rule did not prevent NATO
from acting quickly-in fact, within 24 hours of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 200 I-to invoke,
for the first time in its history, Article 5. Although
the immediate operational impact of that action was
negligible, the NAC decision was a powerful politi-
cal statement of solidarity that was warmly welcomed
by the United States. After all, the shock of the at-
tacks was soon compounded by warnings of addi-
tional, imminent, and potentially catastrophic terror-
ist strikes.
Did the existence of the rule, however, pre-
vent NATO from assuming a more prominent role in
the campaign against terrorism, especially during the
first several months after September II? Probably
not. Other factors clearly motivated the U.S. ap-
proach, such as America's unquestioned right to self-
defense in response to a direct attack on its territory;
an early recognition that NATO could not coordi-
nate all the tools-diplomatic, intelligence, eco-
nomic, financial, law enforcement, as well as mili-
tary-needed for a sustained campaign against or-
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ganizations such as Al Qaeda; and the need to enlist
and maintain support from the vast majority of non-
NATO and Muslim states who reject terrorism. (The
latter goal made it critical to avoid sending any pub-
lic signal that the campaign was NATO's war against
terrorism=-or worse, NATO's war against Muslims.)?
An additional factor in U.S. thinking with respect to
the campaign in Afghanistan was the limited capa-
bility of most Allies to support long-range power
projection. Thus, the United States supported an
important but not lead role for NATO.
Still, the rule's existence did have some ef-
fects. It probably facilitated the October 4, 2001,
NAC agreement on eight specific measures of as-
sistance requested by the United States, including
the deployment of five airborne warning and control
system (AWACS) aircraft and crews to help defend
U.S. airspace. The consensus procedure allowed
every Ally to contribute to the collective effort in
areas identified on the approved menu but did not
obligate Allies to take action in every area. On the
other hand, the consensus rule allowed one Ally-it
was not the United States-to block a proposal in
the NAC in late 2001 that would have directed NMAs
to develop planning options for NATO support to
humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan.
4. Concern over
the Consensus Rule
Although the consensus rule appeared to work
relatively well through 2001, it came under critical
scrutiny, especially in the United States, in 2002.
Two types of concerns were responsible for this de-
velopment: first, the anticipated effects of enlarge-
ment; and second, the prospect of a growing number
of impasses over the planning and launching of
NATO operations. While these concerns were in-
terrelated, there were notable differences in their
presumed targets.
4.1. Enlargement Jitters
Before September 11, key Members of Con-
gress and some in the Executive Branch were of two
minds on the breadth of a fifth round of NATO en-
largement, although there was little doubt that the
Alliance would issue invitations to at least a few Cen-
tral and East European states at its November 2002
summit in Prague." On the one hand, the geopoliti-
cal rationale for a robust enlargement to help com-
plete a "Europe whole and free" was widely ac-
cepted." On the other hand, Congress repeatedly
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signaled its concern-as it had prior to the 1997 in-
vitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Po-
land-that the Prague invitees must be prepared po-
litically and militarily to become security "provid-
ers," not just security "consumers," vis-r-vis NATO.
The political jitters were symbolized by the
so-called "Meciar problem" in the Slovak Republic.
In 1998, Vladimir Meciar, the authoritarian and cor-
rupt Slovak prime minister since 1992, was ousted
by a broad coalition of opposition parties, but he re-
mained an influential political force. Some in Wash-
ington wondered if NATO would risk embarrassment
in the event Slovak voters were to return Meciar or
his party to power once their country was invited to
join. Others worried that, following Slovak acces-
sion to NATO, a new Meciar-dominated government
might not hesitate to abuse the consensus rule and
paralyze the Alliance if it served his narrow politi-
cal interests. Moreover, Meciar was not a unique
case; similar concerns were voiced, for example, re-
garding former Romanian and Bulgarian political
figures.
The ability and willingness of some NATO as-
pirants to meet their defense capabilities commit-
ments to the Alliance also worried American law-
makers and officials. The so-called "burdensharing"
debate was as old as NATO itself, and Members of
Congress were well aware that several longtime Al-
lies-as well as newer Allies such as Hungary-had
disappointing records when it came to providing- the
forces and capabilities the Alliance required. Would
a robust enlargement, some worried, bring more "free
riders" into the Alliance, eroding its military effec-
tiveness? The consensus rule clearly was not the
cause of any Ally's military deficiencies. Yet it did
complicate efforts to exert peer pressure within
ATO on weak performers, who not surprisingly
resisted efforts by the United States, the Secretary
General, and some other Allies to publish more data
on the defense capabilities performance of individual
members.
In the months following September 11, such
political and military concerns over enlargement re-
ceded as the aspirants demonstrated support for the
U.S.-led campaign against terrorism and, in most
cases, willingness to address defense reform and
modernization issues. During their 2002-2003 hear-
ings on enlargement, Senate and House committees
turned to other issues. Would the addition of sev-
eral new members, albeit well-intentioned, slow
down the urgent transformation needed to give NATO
the capabilities and structures to meet 21st-century
threats such as terrorism, its state supporters, and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?
Or would enlargement make it even harder to reach
a consensus on threats to the Alliance, the strategy
and capabilities necessary to meet those threats,
and-most of all-a decision to take military action
promptly, perhaps preemptively, to protect common
security interests?
4.2. The Rule under Fire
If enlargement jitters first focused Congres-
sional attention on NATO decisionmaking, the con-
tentious intra-Alliance dispute over Iraq in early 2003
apparently convinced some Senators that the con-
sensus rule must be changed. The dispute was an
extension of differences at the time within the UN.
The United Kingdom, with American support,
favored a new UNSC Resolution explicitly author-
izing the use offorce against Iraq, while France and
Germany opposed such a step. When the U.S. Perm
Rep first suggested in late January that NMAs begin
planning for the defense of Turkey in view of the
potential threat from Iraq, Belgium, France, Germany
and, initially, Luxembourg balked. Such planning,
they argued, was premature at best; at worst, in their
view, it would send a harmful political signal that
NATO accepted what French officials termed the
"logic of war" with Iraq, thus prejudicing their na-
tions' positions at the UN.
The dispute came to a head with Turkey's for-
mal request, on February 10, for consultations in the
NAC. J2 As part of those consultations, the Chair-
man of the Military Committee briefed the NAC on
the potential Iraqi threat and explained the timelines
necessary to prepare plans to reinforce Turkish
defenses. When Turkey's Perm Rep requested that
the NAC direct the NMAs to prepare such plans for
consideration by the NAC, three allied Perm Reps-
soon revealed to be those of Belgium, France, and
Germany-again objected. Then Secretary General
Lord Robertson quickly circulated a decision sheet,
whereupon those three Allies formally broke silence.
The argument, which by now had become public,
lasted several more days before Belgium and Ger-
many agreed, for a variety of reasons, to a face sav-
ing compromise: Turkey's request was moved from
the NAC to the DPC, where France is not represented.
The DPC quickly reached consensus, on February
16, on guidance to the NMAs to prepare plans to
help protect Turkey through, for example, the de-
ployment of NATO AWACS and support to Allied
deployments of theater missile and chemical and bio-
logical defense capabilities. The NMAs completed
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the planning in the next few days, and on February
19, the DPC authorized the NMAs to implement the
agreed assistance to Turkey.
Although NATO officials understandably tried
to put the best face possible on the incident-Secre-
tary General Robertson described it as "damage
above, not below, the waterline"-its impact, par-
ticularly in Washington, was very serious. J3 For
some, at least, the consensus rule appeared to have
outlived its usefulness. As Senator Jack Reed told
his colleagues on May 8: "First, I agree that we must
eliminate the 'consensus rule,' the antiquated require-
ment in the NATO charter that nearly prevented
NATO from protecting one of its own members,
Turkey, before the commencement of Operation
Iraqi Freedom .... Second, I support the need for a
new rule in NATO that authorizes the members of
the Alliance to suspend the membership of any coun-
try in NATO which no longer supports the ideals of
the Alliance. The recent refusal of support on the
part of some of our NATO Allies during the build-
up for and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom
has shown the need for such a change."
Senator Reed's remarks were delivered dur-
ing the Senate's debate on ratification of the Treaty
protocols on NATO enlargement. The resolution on
ratification, which passed 96-0, contained a "Sense
of the Senate" amendment that, while not endorsing
Senator Reed's harsh prescriptions, clearly reflected
an undercurrent of impatience with customary NATO
decisionmaking procedures. The amendment rec-
ommended that the President place two subjects on
the NAC agenda during 2004: the NATO consensus
rule; and "the merits of establishing a process for
suspending the membership in NATO of a member
country that no longer complies with the NATO prin-
ciples of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule
of law." The amendment also provided for a Presi-
dential report on such discussions to the appropriate
congressional committees. The report was to include:
,?"methods to provide more flexibility to the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to plan po-
tential contingency operations before the formal
NAC approval of such planning"; and ,?"methods to
streamline the process by which NATO makes deci-
sions with respect to conducting military campaigns."
Additional legislative action related to the con-
sensus rule followed over the summer. Specifically,
the fiscal year 2004 Defense Authorization Bill pend-
ing before Congress was amended to require the Sec-
retary of Defense to report to appropriate commit-
tees on his recommendations for "streamlining
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defense, military, and security decisionmaking within
NATO." At least some sponsors of the amendment
appeared to favor increased, perhaps exclusive, reli-
ance on the DPC (versus the NAC) for any decision
affecting Alliance defense capabilities and force
structures, to include the NATO Response Force
(NRF). Then Secretary of State Colin Powell ex-
pressed reservations regarding the Congressional
actions, stating that: "We believe that the current
decision-making procedures work well and serve
United States interests .... NATO is an Alliance,
and no NATO member, including the United States,
would agree to allow Alliance decisions to be made
on defense commitments without its agreement.':"
5. Subsequent Developments
and Future Prospects
Secretary Powell left the Bush Administration
in January 2005, but his position on the consensus
rule has by-and-large prevailed-helped by a trend
on both sides of the Atlantic, which was evident by
late 2004, to cool the intra-Allied tensions created
by the war in Iraq. For its part, the United States
has not actively pursued any major alteration of the
consensus rule. Nor did it pursue the Senate's sug-
gestion to raise the possibility of expelling members
from the Alliance."
At NATO headquarters, the February 2003 dis-
pute over contingency planning for Turkey did spur
some interest in change. Following a review sug-
gested by Secretary General Robertson, the NAC
approved greater (albeit still limited) authority for
NMAs to initiate contingency planning, while the
NAC retained the authority to approve all operational
plans developed in response to an actual or fast-
breaking crisis. For these and other critical deci-
sions, such as whether to dispatch the NRF or en-
large the NATO-ISAF mission, NAC approval by
consensus remains a political requirement. Even the
suggestion of modest changes to the consensus rule
for handling less critical issues-such as NATO per-
sonnel management and budgetary reforms-rings
alarm bells in Allied capitals and at NATO head-
quarters; in 2005, proposals along these lines by a
NATO panel of experts were quietly shelved.
This is not to suggest that the consensus rule
should or will remain immutable. As ongoing or
proposed NATO operations have become more di-
verse, extensive, and demanding, reaching consen-
sus over how and when to commit the AlIiance as a
whole has not been easy. In addition, the increased
number of NATO operations makes it more difficult
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for individual Allies, particularly smaller states, to
decide where and how to allocate their limited capa-
bilities. While not matching the intensity ofthc Fcb-
ruary 2003 episode, several Allies locked horns, for
example, over the proposal to offer NATO training
assistance for Iraqi security forces in 2004; whether
to dispatch the NRF to assist relief efforts following
the Pakistani earthquake in late 2005; and how to
improve NATO's cooperation with non-NATO coun-
tries (such as Australia and Japan) in late 2006.
Unfortunately, the stresses on NATO decision-
making arc likely to continue, if not increase, in com-
ing years. For example, if NATO is to meet its stated
goal for the NRF-that is, the capability to deploy it
anywhere in the world within five days of a NAC
decision and sustain itself for up to a month on a
wide range of missions-several Allies will have to
adjust domestic laws or established practices requir-
ing parliamentary approval before their government
may dispatch forces to its national territory. Other-
wise, if an Ally making a critical contribution to the
NRF in its six-month operational stand-by phase
were to delay or withhold its agreement to deploy
the force, NATO would be obliged to look for a sub-
stitute capability or significantly change the concept
of operations. In addition, given the prospects for
continuing instability in Central Asia and the broader
Middle East, threats from international terrorist net-
works, and the still uncertain prospects for parts of
the Balkans, there is little prospect that the demand
for NATO's services will decline anytime soon.
That said, options exist that could facilitate
decision-making on the planning and conduct of op-
erations that would not fundamentally change the role
of consensus. It might make sense, for example, to
consider extending a prerogative to the SACEUR to
allow him, in consultation with the Secretary Gen-
eral, to undertake in an emerging crisis advanced
preparation ancl/or pre-positioning of key NRF sup-
port units in the potential area of operations. In this
way, the NRF would be better poised to execute an
operation quickly once the necessary NAC approval
has been granted.
A more ambitious option would be to consider
empowering "coalitions within NATO." Under this
approach, a NAC consensus would continue to be
required to authorize a NATO operation. In a depar-
ture from current practice, however, the NAC could
mandate a NATO committee of contributors (NCC),
chaired by the Secretary General, to carry out the
operation on behalf of the Alliance. This committee
would be comprised of those Allies prepared to con-
tribute forces or capabilities to the operation, and it
would enjoy full access to NATO common assets
and capabilities (for example, NATO AWACS and
communications systems) and the NATO command
structure. It would approve the concept of operations,
rules of engagement, military activation orders given
to the SACEUR, and other needed steps to imple-
ment the operation.
The Secretary General would periodically
brief Allies who are not members of the CC on
significant developments affecting the operation, but
those Allies would not participate in determining the
daily management of the operation. Finally, those
Allies who have elected not to belong to the NCC
could not by themselves reopen its mandate in the
NAC; to do so, they would need support from some
threshold (for example, at least one-third) of the NCe
membership.
This option would preserve the consensus rule
for approving NATO operations. It would track with
past practice, whereby an Ally with reservations
about a particular operation will not break silence if
there is overwhelming sentiment in the NAC to pro-
ceed. It also would take into account the potentially
greater difficulty of reaching common threat assess-
ments among all Allies involving non- Article-5 cri-
ses outside the Euro-Atlantic region. The NCC
would make it easier for those Allies who do share a
common threat assessment to draw on NATO assets
and proceed with the Alliance's political blessing to
implement non-Article-5 crisis response missions.
By removing the ability of those who are not en-
gaged in the operation to influence its day-to-day
conduct, this approach could accelerate
deeisionmaking and avoid the image of war by com-
mittee attributed to Operation Allied Force. The NCC
also would be inclusive rather than exclusive: no Ally
could block another's participation, and Allies who
are unable to contribute at the outset would retain
the option of joining the NCe at a later stage. Fi-
nally, the NCC might be particularly appealing to
Allies who are also EU members, as a similar "com-
mittee of contributors" arrangement exists in the EU
European Security and Defense Policy to accommo-
date the potential contributions of non-EU members
to EU-led operations.
6. Conclusion
To paraphrase Winston Churchill's celebrated
remark about democracy, the consensus rule is per-
haps the worst way to manage the Alliance-except
for all the others. Yet the rule, as practiced thus far,
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has not paralyzed the Alliance in the Balkans or Af-
ghanistan. With some relatively straightforward ad-
justments, the rule, like NATO itself, can continue
to adapt to the 21st-century security environment.
1 Article 10 states: "The Parties may. by unanimous agree-
ment. invite any other European State in a position to further the
principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited
may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument
of accession with the Government of the United States of
America. The Government of the United States of America will
inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such .instru-
ment of accession." The Riga Summit Declaration is accessible
at: http://www.nato.inVdocu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm
2 Most NATO committees and working groups are chaired by a
member of the NATO International Staff (IS); on occasion. with
the agreement of other Allies. the chairman may be a senior
official sent from his/her nation's capital or serving in one of the
permanent national delegations to NATO.
3 Each Ally is represented on the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
by an ambassadorial-level Permanent Representative (Perm
Rep). Normally. the NAC meets at least once a week. and.
depending on the issue. some Perm Reps may need guidance
or approval from higher authorities in their capitals. The NAC
meets several times annually at the foreign minister and defense
minister levels and holds periodic summits at the heads of state/
government level. The consensus rule applies as well to deci-
sions made and statements issued at ministerial and summit
meetings.
4 Similar customary practices apply to the NATO military au-
thorities (NMAs). headed by a Military Committee (MC). The
MC includes a military representative from each Ally. and the
chairman of the Military Committee reports to. and receives po-
litical guidance from. the NAC. The International Military Staff.
Supreme Allied Commander. Europe (SACEUR). Supreme Al-
lied Cornmander. Transformation, and various headquarters
commands are part of the NMA structure.
5 The rallying cry "one for all. all for one" is found in Alexander
Dumas, The Three Musketeers.
6 Article 5 reads, in part: "The Parties agree that an armed at-
tack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them,
in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as
it deems necessary [emphasis added], including the use of armed
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No Ally, however, will agree to change current
decisionmaking procedures in a manner deemed con-
trary to its interests. Hence, a paradox exists: con-
sensus will be needed to alter the consensus rule .•
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